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Several theories have been generated to understand the socio-cognitive
mechanisms underlying the unique cooperative abilities of humans. The ‘inter-
dependence hypothesis’ posits first, that the cognitive dimension of human
cooperation evolved in contextswhen several individuals needed to act together
to achieve a common goal, likewhen hunting large prey. Second, themore inter-
dependent individuals are, the more likely they are to provide services to
conspecifics in other contexts. Alternatively, the ‘social tolerance hypothesis’
proposes that higher social tolerance allows conspecifics to cooperate more effi-
ciently and with a wider range of partners. We conducted the first field
experimental evaluation of both hypotheses in our closest living relatives by
contrasting chimpanzees to the less interdependent but more tolerant bonobos.
We compared each species’ performance during a cooperative task: informing
conspecifics about a danger. We presented Gaboon viper models to 82 individ-
uals from five wild communities. Chimpanzees arriving late at the snake were
significantly more likely to have heard a call and less likely to startle, indicating
that chimpanzees were better informed about the presence of the threat than
bonobos. This stems from clear species differences in how individuals adjusted
their callingdecisions to the level of information alreadyavailable. Chimpanzees
were more likely to call and produced more alarm calls when they had not yet
heard a call, whereas bonobos did sowhen they already heard a call. Our results
confirm the link between interdependence and cooperation performance. These
species differences were most likely driven by differences in motivation rather
than in cognitive capacities because both species tended to consider audience
knowledge in their decision to call. Our results inform theories on the evolution
of human cooperation by linking inter-group competition pressure and
in-group cooperative motivation and/or capability.1. Introduction
Humans have evolved sophisticated cooperative systems that are unprecedented
in the animal kingdom and characterized by an exceptional ability to operate
large scale group-level cooperation with non-relatives [1]. The interdependence
hypothesis posits that the cognitive dimension underlying general human
cooperative abilities evolved in food acquisition contexts in which several




2states that humans are more likely to help one another in
non-collaborative contexts because they need each other in
collaborative contexts [2]. The interdependence hypothesis
hereby conceptually links two different forms of human
cooperation: (i) ‘collaboration’ (also referred to as mutualism
[3]) which refers to the joint action of two or more conspecifics
towards a common goal that each participant could not have
reached on their own; and (ii) ‘non-collaborative’ cooperation,
which refers to a service provided by an individual (the coop-
erator) to a conspecific and which provides some form of
fitness benefit to the recipient [4]. This link is corroborated by
empirical cross-cultural studies showing that the need for suc-
cessful coordinated action in a given society increases prosocial
tendencies (i.e. the likelihood to engage in non-collaborative
cooperation) in economical games [5] and food sharing
contexts [6].Hereafter,wedefine ‘cooperation’asboth ‘collabora-
tive’ and ‘non-collaborative’ forms of cooperation and specify
when we refer to one type in particular. The interdependence
hypothesis was initially proposed to understand the evolution
of unique human cognitive abilities but the theoretical foun-
dation of this hypothesis can be extended to non-human
species. Moreover, in order to fully understand the evolutionary
origin of the potential link between socio-cognitive abilities,
prosocial tendencies and cooperation structure, comparative
studies across non-human species are essential.
Besides being our closest genetic relatives, bonobos (Pan
paniscus) and chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) are ideal species
to investigate the interdependence hypothesis. These species
share similar social organization (multi-male multi-female
communities with a high degree of fission–fusion dynamics
and female dispersal), yet they also exhibit striking differen-
ces in their level of broad-scale coordinated actions [7].
Chimpanzees are highly territorial and engage in group-level
structured territorial border patrols, and hostile, sometimes
lethal, inter-group encounters [8,9]. Most chimpanzee popu-
lations hunt monkeys in groups, which increases success
[10,11], and some (e.g. in our study population in Taï) also
engage routinely in collaborative coordinated hunting [10].
By contrast, bonobos, are not territorial, do not engage in
border patrols and inter-group encounters can be peaceful [12]
so that the fitness costs of not coordinating action during
inter-group context in bonobos is probably lower than in chim-
panzees. Bonobos at LuiKotale (our study population) also hunt
monkeys [13], and hunts can involve multiple group members
(B. Fruth, G. Hohmann 2017, unpublished data). Yet, whether
this is a coordinated action is not known. Therefore, following
the argument of the interdependence hypothesis [2], the more
interdependent chimpanzees should have evolved more
complex socio-cognitive skills, be more prosocial and thus
more likely to engage in non-collaborative cooperation and to
perform collaborative activities than bonobos.
However, the direct empirical comparisons currently
available, which are entirely based on comparative tests
conducted in captivity, mainly do not support this prediction.
In fact, while a comparative study on gaze following and inten-
tion attribution found that bonobos performed better than
chimpanzees [14], another study reported better performance
of chimpanzees in perspective taking and knowledge attribu-
tion tasks [15]. In terms of prosociality, experiments show
that while both species help conspecifics to obtain food, bono-
bos tend to be more proactive than chimpanzees in providing
help (reviewed in [16]). Finally, bonobos outperformed chim-
panzees in a collaborative task when the reward was highlymonopolizable [17]. These later observations led to the formu-
lation of an alternative to the interdependence hypothesis: the
social tolerance hypothesis [17].
This hypothesis posits that the higher social tolerance of
bonobos should allow them to cooperate more efficiently and
with a wider range of partners than chimpanzees. Additional
support for the social tolerance hypothesis comes from captive
and field studies showing that the tolerance of bonobos allows
them to spontaneously share food with out-group members
[18] while chimpanzees are only willing to collaborate with
specific in-group members, such as those with whom they
share a close relationship [19]. However, to our knowledge,
no studies have so far directly compared the socio-cognitive
abilities and non-collaborative cooperative tendencies of bono-
bos and chimpanzees in a wild setting. This is important
because the overall cooperation dynamic and related level of
interdependence vary in captivity compared to the wild (e.g.
apes do not need to defend a territoryor acquire food collabora-
tively in captivity). Such differences between wild and captive
settings may affect the incentive to cooperate and hence may
alter the outcome of cooperative and socio-cognitive tests.
Accordingly, the aim of our study was to contrast the inter-
dependence and the social tolerance hypotheses by comparing
the performance and socio-cognitive capacities of western
chimpanzees from Taï and bonobos from LuiKotale, during a
non-collaborative cooperative task based on a natural context
in the wild. We used a snake model stimulus paradigm allow-
ing the apes to express a non-collaborative cooperative acts,
namely to produce alarm calls that alert conspecifics to a
deadly threat and hereby potentially enhancing conspecifics’
fitness.Alarm calling is broadly used as an example of coopera-
tive behaviour in vertebrates (e.g. [3,4]). The cooperative nature
of alarm calls is highlighted by studies showing that birds [20]
and mammals [21,22] produce alarm calls only in the presence
of others. This suggests these calls function to make conspeci-
fics aware of a threat, which is a cooperative service provided
by the caller. Furthermore, in primates, some even adapt
their calling behaviour to the danger level to which conspeci-
fics are exposed [23]. It is important to note that most of
these studies focus on the behaviours involved and remain
agnostic as to the precise cognitive mechanisms, such as
whether or not second-order intentionality or full mental
state attribution of the audience’s need is involved. In chimpan-
zees, snake model presentations revealed that alarm calls were
producedwhile monitoring the audience [24,25], and that indi-
viduals were more likely to call and producedmore alarm calls
when ignorant individuals were present in the audience
(i.e. individuals who had neither seen the snake nor heard
an alarm call [26]). Chimpanzees thus appear to perceive, to
some extent, the need for the audience to be informed and
behave accordingly, although the cognitive mechanisms that
this may require remain debated (see also [25]). Whether
bonobos express similar strategies remains unknown as, to
our knowledge, experimental studies presenting a predator
model have never been conducted with this species.
Alarm calling has a number of possible functions across
bird and mammal species such as confusing, deterring or
mobbing the predator and/or informing conspecifics
(reviewed in [27]). The function of interest in this study is the
transmission of information such that the audience gains a
benefit by being aware of the nearby threat, thereby reducing
the danger. Vipers are a deadly threat to chimpanzees and




3Alarm calling at vipers has been shown to primarily function
to inform other individuals in chimpanzees [25,26]. Because
the function of calls produced around vipers is unknown in
bonobos, we assumed that the calls also function to inform
others, especially given that snake-associated behaviour is
broadly comparable to that observed in chimpanzees. Inform-
ing individuals present in the vicinity of a danger can be seen as
a non-collaborative cooperative task [3]. The success at this task
should reflect a species’ overall cooperative tendency and its
socio-cognitive abilities to respond to the needs of others. We
are not aiming to investigate in our study the detail of what
specific socio-cognition is involved in completing the task.
The first aim of the study was to compare the efficiency of
the alarm calling system (as a measure of success at solving a
non-collaborative cooperative task) between wild bonobos
and chimpanzees, using the same, highly salient, naturally
present stimuli in both species: a model of a Gaboon viper
(hereafter ‘snake model’). All communities tested have been
observed to see and react to these snakes within their natural
habitat using various behaviours, including startles and
alarm calls. Importantly, not all individuals emit alarm calls
upon seeing real Gaboon vipers ([26], C. Girard-Buttoz 2016,
personal observation for the bonobos). Variation in the likeli-
hood to alarm call provides a basis for examining inter-
species differences in the efficiency of the alarm calling
system and the factors that affect the likelihood to call. If the
interdependence hypothesis holds true, we predict that the
more ‘interdependent’ Taï chimpanzees evolved specific
cooperation-related cognitive skills (here, signalling depending
on the knowledge status of the audience about the snake).
Accordingly, chimpanzees are expected to be better at solving
the alarm calling task (i.e. informing all other conspecifics). By
contrast, the ‘social tolerance hypothesis’ predicts that com-
paratively more ‘tolerant’ LuiKotale bonobos are more
efficient at transmitting information to the entire audience by
being less selective cooperators and thus globally better at
the informing task.
In order to assess performance at the task, we first used
the startling reaction upon seeing the snake of individuals
who were not the first to arrive at the snake as a proxy for
the degree of information they possess about the snake.
Specifically, we expected that informed individuals would
startle less upon seeing the snake. Second, we directly evalu-
ated the acoustic and visual information received by each
individual before and upon arriving at the snake.
The second aim of the study was to understand the under-
lying mechanisms explaining potential species differences in
information transfer efficiency by comparing the social cues
that trigger alarm call production in chimpanzees and bono-
bos. Specifically, we assessed if potential signallers take the
audiences’ knowledge into account in their decision to produce
alarm calls by analysing if potential signallers were more likely
to call and producedmore alarm calls when (i) no call had been
uttered yet and (ii) some individuals who had not seen the
snake (ignorant individuals) were present in the audience.2. Material and methods
(a) Study communities
We conducted the study within the Taï Chimpanzee and the
LuiKotale Bonobo Projects between November 2015 and Decem-
ber 2017 on five fully habituated wild ape communities: threechimpanzee communities (Taï East, Taï North and Taï South)
at the Taï National Park, Côte d’Ivoire and two bonobo commu-
nities (Bompusa and East) at the LuiKotale bonobo research site,
Democratic Republic of Congo. For consistency, we defined for
this study the same three age categories for both species.
Adults were defined as all males and females greater than or
equal to 10 years of age (i.e. all adults and subadults, [28]). Juven-
iles were defined as non-adult individuals who are not carried by
their mother and thus could arrive at the snake independently
from their mother. Infants were defined as individuals carried
by their mother. The composition of the study communities is
given in the electronic supplementary material, table S1.
(b) Experimental protocol
On the experiment day, L.S., P.T. or an assistant followed a party of
the study communities and indicated his position to the exper-
imenter (C.G.B.) sending GPS location from device to device
using Garmin Rino GPS. C.G.B. placed himself ahead of the
group, out of visual range of the apes (greater than 200 m) and
placed the snakemodel behind a log or a large root on the expected
path of the party (electronic supplementary material, figure S1B).
We chose experimental locations on trails or in relatively open
areas allowing for optimal filming of the apes’ reactions to the
snake models. We aimed for similar visibility in the area around
the snake in both species to avoid ecological bias resulting from
differences in habitat density. All the apes approaching the snake
model location were video-taped as soon as they were in visual
range and until all the apes exited the area surrounding the
snake. We used a three camera protocol to video-tape, in detail,
the behavioural reactions of the apes to the snake model and
their call production (see details in the electronic supplementary
material). We also recorded continuously throughout the exper-
iment the party composition around the snake as well as all the
calls heard by individuals in other parties (see the electronic sup-
plementary material).
We conducted a total of 33 different snakemodel presentations
at different locations (21 in chimpanzees and 12 in bonobos). On a
few occasions, the same snake model was repeatedly presented on
consecutive days at the same location (see the electronic sup-
plementary material). This allowed us to increase our sample
size to 42 experiment days. After excluding the last experiment
in chimpanzees for which the main camera fogged, we were left
with 32 separate snake presentations and 41 experimental days.
In total, 82 adults and juveniles saw the snake model at least
once (52 chimpanzees and 30 bonobos). In order to avoid habitu-
ation to the experimental protocol, we made sure to leave at least
two weeks between two exposures to different snake models for
each individual and conducted 23 mock trials during which all
experimental conditions were met but in the absence of the
snake model stimuli (see the electronic supplementary material).
(c) Video analysis
We synchronized and coded all the videos of the experiments
using MANGOLD INTERACT 14.6.0.0. Each individual entering the
visual range of any video was treated as a focal. We detected
when the focal saw the snake, which was clearly visible on the
video because the apes systematically stopped their locomotion
towards the snake, looked in the direction of the snake and
either startled, stared at the snake or resumed approaching the
snake at a slower pace. We also coded whether the ape startled
(defined as jumping or running away from the snake in a direc-
tion not in line with general travel direction) upon detecting the
snake. Finally, we coded all the alarm calls produced by the focal
individual during the experiment and all the focal behaviour, its
distance to the snake and its position in space when visible on the
video (see the electronic supplementary material).
The identity of the caller was assessed either visually seeing




4based on the observers’ speaking the identity of the caller after each
call on the video. The alarm calls comprised alarm hoos and alarm
barks for the chimpanzees and soft alarm, alarm whistle and alarm
barks for the bonobos. All of these calls were produced during
encounters with real vipers (see details in the electronic sup-
plementary material and electronic supplementary material,
figure S3).
(d) Statistical analysis and model descriptions
We used a series of general linear mixed models (GLMMs) to test
our predictions regarding species differences in the general effi-
ciency of the alarm calling system, and in the socio-cognitive
parameters influencing whether an individual called or not and
the number of calls produced. The structure of all the models is
summarized in the electronic supplementary material, table S2.
(i) Information transfer efficiency model
In our first model (model 1a), we assessed the general efficiency
of the information transfer around the snake in both species.
We used the likelihood for individuals to startle when they
were the first to see the snake as a baseline for the startling
rate of each species. We then quantified the reduction in startling
rate between the first to arrive and individuals arriving later
at the snake as a proxy for the level of information about the
threat that was available to these individuals prior to seeing
the threat. We ran a GLMM with a binomial error structure,
using ‘startled upon seeing the snake, yes or no’ as a response.
To test whether bonobos and chimpanzees differed in how much
the startle response was reduced between the first to see the
snake and also all subsequent arrivers who saw the snake (here-
after late arrivers), we included an interaction in the model
between the two predictors species and first arriver (yes or no).
In addition, we controlled for individual sex and age class
(infant, juvenile or adult), and for the number of exposures to
snake models each individual had before each experiment. We
included infants here because, even though they arrive on the
back of their mother in the vicinity of the snake, they may walk
on their own to the snake itself.
(ii) Information available to late arriver models
We took the perspective of receivers to run two additional
models to assess species differences in the level of information
available to late arrivers. In the first model (model 1b), we inves-
tigated the likelihood for a late arriver to have received auditory
information about the threat before approaching the snake using
a GLMM with binomial error structure with ‘late arriver heard
an alarm call before seeing the snake: yes or no’ as a response.
Individuals were considered to have heard an alarm call if an
alarm call was produced while they were in the party around
the snake or if they could hear an alarm call while being in a
neighbouring party to the one present at the snake.
In the secondmodel (model 1c), we investigated the likelihood
for a late arriver to receive visual information about the snake
location while approaching the snake. We ran a GLMM with a
binomial error structure and ‘a conspecific was on the ground
within 5 m of the snake with its body oriented towards the snake
(later on defined as ‘snake-oriented-body’, electronic supple-
mentary material, figure S4) yes or no’ as a response. In both
models, species was used as a test predictor and individual’s age
class and sex as control predictors.
(iii) Triggers of alarm calling models
In a second set of models, we took the perspective of the signaller
and aimed at understanding the factors explaining species
differences in the information available to the late arrivers by
investigating the parameters triggering alarm calling behaviourin each species. In model 2a, we assessed which socio-cognitive
parameters affected the likelihood to call during the experiment.
For each individual in each experiment, we split the experimental
time into time slots (see the electronic supplementary material)
depending on the presence or absence of individuals present
in the party around the snake who had not seen the snake yet
(hereafter ‘ignorant individuals’).
We ran a GLMM with a binomial error structure to evaluate
the parameters affecting the likelihood to call for each individual
in each time slot using ‘call: yes or no’ as a response. To test if
individuals adjusted their calling behaviour depending on the
knowledge level of the audience, we used two test predictors:
(i) someone already produced an alarm call, yes or no (auditory
information available), and (ii) are there ignorant individuals in
the audience (i.e. individuals who have not seen the snake,
visual information). To test if individuals considered who else
could inform the audience in their decision to call, we used a
third test predictor: (iii) the number of other potential signallers.
We used (iv) ‘order in which individual see the snake’ (the first to
see the snake on a given experiment day gets a one, the second to
see the snake a two, etc.) to assess if individuals who see the
snake later were less likely to inform conspecifics than
individuals who see it first. We added all the two-way interactions
between each of these four parameters and species as our aim was
to assess species differences in parameters triggering the likelihood
to call. We also incorporated as a test predictor the sex of the indi-
vidual in interaction with species because males and females
have different social status in relation to one another in each species.
Finally, we added age class (i.e. adult and juvenile), number of
snakes seen before each experiment and the time since the individ-
ual had seen the snake in this particular experiment as control
variables (to control for the possibility of habituation, i.e. that
alarm calling fades across time in each individual independently
from external elements [29]). We did not include infants in the
analysis here because their calling behaviourmight not be represen-
tative of a fully cognitively developed individual of each species.
Finally, we used a subset of the data including only individuals
which gave alarm calls to investigate which factors influenced
the number of calls uttered. We fitted another GLMM with a
Poisson error structure and the number of calls produced as
the response variable (model 2b). The predictor and control vari-
able structure was identical to the one of model 2a. In both
models 2a and 2b, we used the log of duration of each time slot
as an offset term.
In all models, to avoid pseudo replication, we incorporated
four random effects, the individual identity, the study community,
the snake model number and the experiment number. For all
models, we included themaximal random slope structure between
each fixed predictor (test and control) and each random effect. All
analyses were conducted in R 3.5.1 [30] using the function glmer
from the package ‘lme4’. In each model, we tested for species
difference in the test predictors by comparing the full model to a
corresponding null model. We checked for model stability and
the absence of collinearity and overdispersion issue (model 2b)
which revealed no violation of the models’ assumptions (see the
electronic supplementary material).3. Results
(a) Social parameters and general response to the
snake model
We conducted 41 experiments using seven different snake
models on 82 juvenile and adult chimpanzees and bonobos.
Detailed statistical distributions of parameters related to
party size around the snake, frequency of exposure to the
snake and general differences in bonobo and chimpanzee
Table 1. Results of models investigating the information available to late arrivers (models 1a, 1b and 1c). (s.e. indicates the standard error of the estimate for
each predictor. The coded level for each categorical predictor is indicated in brackets. Control predictors are italicized. Significant p-values ( p < 0.05) are
indicated in bold. CIlow and CIhigh indicate the lower and upper limits of the 95% confidence interval for the estimates of each predictor. The ‘focal’ indicates
the receiver approaching the snake.)
model response predictor estimate s.e. CIlow CIhigh χ
2 p
1a startle (Y/N) intercept −1.51 0.84 −21.47 0.30 — —
species (chimpanzee) −1.60 0.87 −19.32 0.24 — —
first to see the snake (yes) 1.47 0.87 −0.17 24.33 — —
species: first to see the snake 3.15 1.28 1.07 31.27 6.95 0.008
number of snake seen −0.53 0.40 −8.36 0.25 1.07 0.302
sex of the focal (male) 0.78 0.59 −1.13 8.83 1.50 0.220
age of the focal (infant) 1.01 1.08 −9.40 14.79 0.97 0.616
age of the focal ( juvenile) −0.22 0.66 −6.31 4.96 — —
1b late arriver heard
an alarm call before
seeing the snake (Y/N)
intercept 0.03 1.35 −40.93 45.12 — —
species (chimpanzee) 4.46 1.78 0.708 101.46 6.32 0.012
sex of the focal (male) 0.15 0.77 −25.67 29.42 0.03 0.865
age of the focal (infant) −2.98 1.38 −60.59 3.05 2.86 0.239
age of the focal ( juvenile) −0.15 0.89 −27.94 28.08 — —
1c a conspecific was
with snake-oriented-body
when the late arriver
saw the snake (Y/N)
intercept 0.28 0.90 −1.88 2.70 — —
species (chimpanzee) −0.43 1.01 −3.23 1.80 0.18 0.675
sex of the focal (male) −0.20 0.46 −1.37 0.92 0.17 0.676
age of the focal (infant) 1.14 0.93 −1.61 13.20 1.51 0.470





calling behaviours around the snake are provided in the
electronic supplementary material, table S3; Movies S1 and
S2 show examples of chimpanzee and bonobo reactions to
the snake model.(b) Information available to late arrivers
(models 1a, 1b and 1c)
Our results from models 1a and 1b both indicate that
chimpanzees were better informed about the snake than
bonobos. First, whereas the first individual to arrive at the
snake in each experiment had a similar mean probability to
startle in both species (75% in chimpanzees and 70.8% in
bonobos), the likelihood to startle for the late arrivers was
significantly lower in chimpanzees than in bonobos (inter-
action species*first to see the snake in model 1a: likelihood
ratio test (LRT), p = 0.008; table 1). Specifically, late-arriving
chimpanzees were three times less likely to startle than late-
arriving bonobos (12.9% versus 42.7%; figure 1a). Second,
chimpanzee late arrivers received more auditory information
about the snake than bonobos as they were more likely to
have heard a call before seeing the snake (94% versus 62%,
effect of species in model 1b: LRT, p = 0.012; table 1; electronic
supplementary material, figure S5). However, there was no
species difference in the visual information available upon
arriving at the snake because the likelihood to have a conspeci-
fic on the ground within 5 m of the snake with its body
oriented towards the snake (electronic supplementary
material. figure S4) when approaching the snake was notsignificantly different between chimpanzees and bonobos
(55% versus 47%, effect of species in model 1c: LRT, p = 0.675;
table 1; electronic supplementary material, figure S5).(c) Triggers of alarm calls (models 2a and 2b)
Whether another individual already called or not impacted
the likelihood to call and the number of calls produced differ-
ently in both species (interaction species*someone called: LRT,
p = 0.004 in model 2a and p = 0.003 in model 2b; table 2).
Chimpanzees were less likely to call and produced less calls
when someone already called whereas bonobos were more
likely to call and uttered more calls if someone already
called (figure 1b and electronic supplementary material,
figure S6). In addition, whereas order in which individuals
saw the snake did not have a strong impact on the likelihood
to call in chimpanzees, in bonobos, individuals were least
likely to call the later they saw the snake in the experiment
(interaction species*order of arrival: LRT, p = 0.027, model
2a; table 2; electronic supplementary material, figure S7).
Beyond the species differences, individuals of both
species were on average three times more likely to call
when ignorant individuals were present in the audience
(60% in chimpanzees and 65% in bonobos) than when not
(27% in chimpanzees and 18% in bonobos; figure 1c) indi-
cated by a trend in model 2a (LRT, p = 0.066; table 2) and
by a 95% confidence interval of the estimate that did not over-
lap with 0. Most individuals never called in any situation
when there were no ignorant individuals in the audience
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Figure 1. Chimpanzees and bonobos startling reaction and calling behaviour upon seeing the snake model: (a) probability to startle for the first individual to see
the snake (left) and for the late arrivers (right) in both species (model 1a); (b) probability to call when someone already called (right) or not (left) in both species
(model 2a); and (c) probability to call when ignorant in the audience were present (left) or not (right). For all the plots, the thick horizontal black lines depict the
model lines (i.e. the probability to startle or to call calculated by the model while controlling for all other variables). The long dark grey and light grey horizontal
lines depict the mean from the real data for bonobos and chimpanzees, respectively. The thin vertical lines depict the lower and upper ends of the 95% confidence
interval.
Table 2. Results of models investigating the triggers of alarm calls (models 2a and 2b). (s.e. indicates the standard error of the estimate for each predictor. The
coded level for each categorical predictor is indicated in brackets. Control predictors are italicized. Significant p-values ( p < 0.05) are indicated in bold. Trends
(0.5 < p < 0.1) are indicated in italics. CIlow and CIhigh indicate the lower and upper limits of the 95% confidence interval for the estimates of each predictor.
The ‘focal’ indicates the potential signaller.)
model response predictor estimate s.e. CIlow CIhigh χ
2 p
2a call Y/N intercept −7.11 1.15 −10.35 −5.01 — —
species (chimpanzee) 5.34 1.35 5.34 2.90 — —
someone already called (yes) 3.08 1.11 3.08 0.96 — —
order of arrival −2.01 1.03 −4.64 0.06 — —
sex of the focal (male) 0.14 0.48 −0.82 1.26 0.08 0.780
ignorant individual present (yes) 1.25 0.56 0.17 2.62 3.38 0.066
average number of potential signallers −0.31 0.27 −1.00 0.30 1.12 0.289
species: someone already called −5.02 1.44 −9.26 −2.41 8.18 0.004
species: order of arrival 2.39 1.04 0.29 5.18 4.88 0.027
age of the focal age ( juvenile) −1.82 0.59 −3.32 −0.77 9.43 0.002
number of snakes seen by the focal −0.13 0.47 −1.18 0.87 0.06 0.802
time since the focal has seen the snake 0.07 0.18 −6.54 0.46 0.13 0.719
2b number of
calls uttered
(intercept) −2.91 0.73 −4.62 −1.33 — —
species (chimpanzee) 2.28 0.60 0.94 3.66 — —
someone already called (yes) 1.50 0.43 0.48 2.56 — —
order of arrival 0.29 0.14 −0.08 0.70 2.54 0.111
sex of the focal (male) 0.23 0.34 −-0.45 0.94 0.47 0.495
ignorant individual present (yes) −0.48 0.55 −1.70 0.74 0.61 0.435
average number of potential signallers −0.16 0.21 −0.65 0.35 0.50 0.480
species: someone called −2.32 0.46 −3.57 −1.22 9.03 0.003
age of the focal ( juvenile) −0.85 0.44 −1.80 −0.02 3.54 0.060
number of snakes seen by the focal −0.15 0.31 −0.74 0.46 0.22 0.637






771.4% of bonobos). Finally, concerning our control variables,
juveniles were less likely to call than adults (LRT, p = 0.002,
model 2a; table 2). Furthermore, the number of experimental
snakes seen before a particular trial and the time since the
individuals have seen the snake within a trial did not signifi-
cantly influence the likelihood to call or the number of calls
produced (all p > 0.6; table 2).ing.org/journal/rspb
Proc.R.Soc.B
287:202005234. Discussion
Our detailed analysis of behavioural reactions of wild
bonobos and chimpanzees to a Gaboon viper model revealed
some clear differences between the two species, highlighting
differing socio-cognitive mechanisms underlying within-
group non-collaborative cooperation. Taken together, our
results provide empirical support for one of the core concepts
of the interdependence hypothesis [2] to species other than
humans and therefore indicate that this proposed mechanism
for the emergence of cooperation has a deep evolutionary
history. Chimpanzees, the more interdependent species,
performed better at a cooperative task (here informing con-
specifics about a danger) in a non-collaborative context.
Specifically, late arriver chimpanzees were less likely to startle
and were more likely to have heard an alarm call (i.e. better
informed) than late arriver bonobos. Given that the likelihood
to startle for the first individual to see the snake was similar
in both species, we rule out that this species difference is
caused by any species-specific tendency to startle more when
seeing snakes.
Instead, the difference in the startling responses of later
arrivers possibly stems from a species difference in how indi-
viduals adjusted their behavioural responses to the level of
information already available to conspecifics. Specifically,
chimpanzees transmitted the information about the snake
when needed by calling if they had not yet heard someone
call, whereas bonobos were less likely to call if they had
not yet heard a call.
In our study, we also reduced, to the best of our abilities,
the impact of potentially confounding variables. To control
for the effect of habitat, we placed the snake model in areas
with similar visibility for both species. The lower perform-
ance of bonobos at the alarm calling tasks cannot be driven
by the lower likelihood to call in juveniles compared to
adults in both species (model 2a) because juveniles discov-
ered the snake only in one experiment (5.2%) in bonobos
compared to six experiments (27.3%) in chimpanzees. It can
also not be explained by gregariousness as party sizes
around the snake were smaller in bonobos than in chimpan-
zees (electronic supplementary material, table S3). Also, in
both species, a similar proportion of individuals who heard
an alarm call before approaching the snake heard it less
than a minute before (81% in chimpanzees and 80% in bono-
bos), suggesting that the group spread was similar in
chimpanzees and bonobos. It is also unlikely that the species
differences arose from a higher level of non-vocal social infor-
mation transfer in chimpanzees. Indeed, upon arriving at the
snake the likelihood to have a conspecific oriented towards
the snake and within 5 m of the snake was not significantly
different in chimpanzees and bonobos, and both chimpan-
zees and bonobos gestured towards the snake only on one
occasion. Finally, better information transfer in chimpanzees
is unlikely to arise from a higher propensity of chimpanzees,as compared to bonobos, to produce alarm calls in general
because a recent study found that bonobos were more
likely to produce alarm calls upon discovering a novel
object than chimpanzees [31].
In our study, we could not control for the presence of
bond partners because social relationship data were missing
for two communities, but this parameter is unlikely to explain
the species difference found in our study. In fact, the presence
of bond partners did not increase the likelihood to call in
a similar snake experiment on Eastern chimpanzees [26].
For bonobos, we cannot exclude that individuals arriving
early at the snake called only if specific group members, such
as bond partners or kin, were present around the snake (see
below). Yet, more selective production of alarm calls in bono-
bos as compared to chimpanzees is one of the predictions
derived from the interdependence hypothesis.
There are several possible explanations for the species
differences found in our study. This could reflect: (i) a lack of
ability of bonobos to assess the need of their conspecifics to
be informed, (ii) a low intrinsic motivation to cooperate
by making every other bonobo aware of the threat, and (iii) a
different function for the calls in the two species. The first
option is unlikely as both species show abilities to assess
what another can see as shown in experiments where chim-
panzees and bonobos took advantage of what conspecifics
have seen in competitive situations [32,33]. This is confirmed
by our findings as individuals of both species tended
to be less likely to call when there was no ignorant indivi-
dual in the audience (i.e. they kept track of who had seen the
snake or not). The second option seems more likely, that
the lower performance of bonobos in our alarm calling task
may reflect a difference in intrinsic motivation to cooperate
by informing others (see below). This provides some
contrast to the overall view of the interdependence hypothesis
by showing that while interdependence does indeed promote
more efficient within-group non-collaborative cooperation,
this is not necessarily linked to differences in cognitive
abilities in two closely related species, at least in terms of
attending to other’s knowledge state. Instead, interdependence
may enhance the motivation to engage in non-collaborative
cooperation.
Finally, while a primary motivation to call in both species
seems to be to inform ignorant others, we also cannot fully
rule out that calls serve additional functions in each species.
For example, the fact that in our study, bonobos were more
likely to call when someone had already called indicates that
they may call also to acknowledge that they have seen the
threat (a possible secondary function in Thomas langurs [22]
and chimpanzees [25]).
Our behavioural data show that both species tended to be
more likely to call when there was an ignorant individual in
the audience and is in line with a previous study using the
same experimental paradigm but in a different subspecies
(i.e. Eastern chimpanzees [26]).We are agnostic as to the under-
lying socio-cognitive mechanisms required, in particular
whether or not this pattern of calling shows that apes can attri-
bute mental states to others (see [29,34]). However, regardless
of the precise mechanism, alarm calling patterns in Eastern
[26] and Western chimpanzees (our study) and bonobos (our
study) suggest a level of attention to the audience perhaps
not yet demonstrated in non-ape species.
Non-collaborative cooperative acts (here alarm calling)




8recipient outweighs the cost for the cooperator [3]. Clearly,
potential death following a bite by a Gaboon viper is costlier
than the production of alarm calls. Our results indicate that
both species do not differ in the cognitive capacities to call
when information is needed by others. Thus, the question is
why, unlike chimpanzees, bonobos invest less in calling to
make sure that everybody is informed about the threat?
The answer probably lies in the difference in the level of
between individual interdependence in each species, poten-
tially owing to differences in territoriality. Chimpanzees are
highly territorial and are interdependent on each other for
coordinated action in territorial activity such as border
patrols and to win, potentially lethal, inter-group conflicts.
To avoid a large power imbalance that can lead to killing
[35], in-group members need to coordinate their actions to
reduce potential costs. In chimpanzees [36] and more globally
in territorial monkey species and in humans [37], larger
groups outcompete smaller neighbouring groups in inter-
group encounters. They also have larger territories and
benefit from enhanced reproductive success ([36] reviewed
in [37]). In Taï chimpanzees, males almost systematically
take part in inter-group conflicts and females participate in
more than 90% of these events [9]. In this context, the death
of an individual of either sex influences the competitive abil-
ities of the community and thereby the fitness of its members.
This may increase the incentive for each individual chimpan-
zee to ensure that every member of the community is
informed about the snake in our experiment. By contrast,
bonobos do not have a defined territory to defend and
inter-group encounters are often peaceful [38]. In this context,
the death of a specific individual might not have direct
costs for the entire community but may rather affect coalition-
ary support available to kin (e.g. mothers and sons).
Such differences in how fitness gains occur in the two
species may explain why, in our snake experiment, bonobos
do not attend to the needs of several others simultaneously
as systematically as chimpanzees.
In human experimental studies, high levels of between-
group competition incentivizes within-group non-collabora-
tive cooperation (e.g. [39]). In our study, bonobos arriving
late at the snake were less likely to call whereas the likelihood
to call did not decrease for late-arriving chimpanzees (while
controlling for if others called or not and the presence of
ignorant individuals in the audience). Thus, the responsibility
to call rests mostly with those arriving early in bonobos but
not in chimpanzees. This result supports the view that indi-
vidual chimpanzees take more responsibility in making
sure everyone is informed about the snake than bonobos.
Even if signallers do not coordinate calling per se to achieve
a common goal (e.g. calling altogether, which would be
seen more as mobbing behaviour towards a threat [27]), in
chimpanzees, they collectively succeed at the task to inform
everyone, a potential collective action. Thus, the overall
success at information transfer depends on the behaviour
of each potential signaller. Our results are in line with a
meta-analysis on 138 primate species which showed that
highly territorial species and those in which the philopatric
sex is the dominant (as is the case in our study for the chim-
panzee) are more successful at resolving collective action
problems [40].
Our results do not support the tolerance hypothesis
because bonobos were not more successful than chimpanzees
at keeping track of others needs and at informing everyone.They are also not in line with captive experimental studies
showing better abilities of bonobos to collaborate with every-
one, including unfamiliar individuals [17], and to succeed in
competitive socio-cognitive tasks [14] than chimpanzees.
These discrepancies might arise from differences in individual
intrinsic motivations to cooperate between wild and captive
individuals (see above). Another difference might be linked
to the nature of the task and the associated reward. In captive
studies, individuals gain direct benefits from completing the
task as they usually get access to highly preferred food
resources. By contrast, in our experiment, the benefit for the
cooperator is delayed substantially with individual pay-offs
arising from the overall competitive ability of the community.
In captivity, collaboration by paired chimpanzees can be
impaired by a lack of tolerance with the dominant individual
often monopolizing the reward after collaboration, whereas
more tolerant bonobos are more likely to share the reward per-
haps facilitating their increased likelihood to engage in
collaborative tasks with food rewards [17]. By contrast, in the
specific case of our experiment, social tolerance per se may
not play a strong role in enhancing non-collaborative coopera-
tive abilities of the bonobos.
The wealth of experimental studies conducted on captive
chimpanzees and bonobos (e.g. [14,17,19,41]) shed light on
several of the socio-cognitive and cooperative abilities of our
two closest relatives and thus have contributed greatly to our
understanding of the evolution of unique human cognition
and cooperative abilities. Our results bring our knowledge a
step further. In fact, we provide for the first, to our knowledge,
time empirical support to major theories on the evolution of
cooperation in humans using a comparative experiment on
wild living individuals fromour two closest relatives in an eco-
logically relevant context. As predicted by the
interdependence hypothesis [2], the species which engages
more routinely in group-level collaboration (the chimpanzee)
performed best at a within-group non-collaborative coopera-
tive task, and this performance was tightly linked to
individual behavioural decisions. However, our results indi-
cate that this performance may not stem, as predicted by the
interdependence hypothesis, from differences in cognitive
capacities between chimpanzees and bonobos butmay instead
be linked to chimpanzees having a higher motivation to
cooperate by informing others of a threat. Finally, the better
performance of the more territorial species (the chimpanzee)
in an in-group non-collaborative cooperative task highlights
the considerable role that inter-group competition may have
had on the evolution of the extraordinary in-group cooperative
capability observed in humans [42].
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